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Optimal use of information in litigation:
should regulatory information be withheld




We examine the value of incorporating regulatory information into the court liability
decision and making it publicly available, when the causality of harm is uncertain.
Public access to regulatory information, coupled with its use in a liability decision,
not only improves the accuracy of court adjudication but also guides victims to more
informed decisions about their lawsuits, when victims' private information on causality
of harm is verifiable to the court. When victims' information is unverifiable, however,
withholding regulatory information until after victims bring lawsuits induces them to
utilize their private information better in their litigation decisions, and thus may be
socially desirable.
1. Introduction
• Uncovering truth is an essential part of court proceedings. In tort cases, for ex-
ample, courts expend many resources processing information to determine the magni-
tude of harm, negligence, injurers' liability, etc. While litigants are the meiin providers
of information under the current adversarial system, the government is also an impor-
tant source of information when performing its role as regulator. Various regulatory
agencies monitor potential tortfeasors (e.g., polluting chemical firms) and collect rele-
vant information (e.g., monthly pollution discharges). This regulatory information can
be used later in a court proceeding should a lawsuit be brought against the party to
whom the information is relevant. More important, several U.S. laws edlow public
* University of Wisconsin-Madison and Yale Law School; yche@facstaff.wisc.edu.
** Fairfield University; deamhart@fairl.fairfield.edu.
We are grateful for helpful comments from James Andreoni, Karl Scholz, Peter Siegelman, and other
seminar participants at the University of Wisconsin and the fourth annual American Law and Economics
Conference held at Stanford University in 1994. We are especially indebted to Michael Riordan (Editor) and
two referees who made useful comments and discovered a technical error in an earlier version. All remaining
errors are our sole responsibility. This article was completed while the first author was visiting the Yale Law
School, whose hospitality, along with the support from the John Olin Faculty Fellowship, is gratefully
acknowledged. The first author acknowledges financial support from the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foun-
dation.
120 Copyright © 1997, RAND
CHE AND EARNHART / 121
access to much of this regulatory information and other government-held information,'
which can influence victims' decisions to litigate.
Until very recently, the law and economics literature has not addressed such basic
questions as why information is gathered and how it should be used. An exception is
the recent literature that explores the value of accurate adjudication in damage and
liability assessment (Kaplow and Shavell, 1994, 1996; Kaplow, 1994). Although these
articles illuminate the merit of gathering accurate information with regard to the pro-
vision of deterrence, their attention is Umited to situations where the government is the
sole enforcement party. In practice, however, much enforcement is initiated by private
citizens through civil litigation, especially in areas such as product liability, antitrust,
medical malpractice, and to some extent, environmental protection. In antitrust enforce-
ment, for instance, private suits have consistently outnumbered government suits by a
wide margin in the postwar period.^
In this article we study how the govenmient should manage regulatory information
to induce efflcient private enforcement. In so doing, we focus on two areas of policy
intervention: (1) the liability rule and (2) public access to regulatory information. Clear-
ly, incorporating regulatory information into the liability rule can make adjudication
more accurate. Access to regulatory information, on the other hand, can influence the
victims' litigation decision. Suppose, for example, that a cancer victim suspects that
pollution from a chemical plant caused her disease but, lacking information about the
carcinogenic quaUties of the pollutant, cannot be certain.^ In this situation, regulatory
information linking the plant's emissions to similar cases of cancer will encourage her
to sue, while information casting doubt on such a link will discourage her from suing.
Thus, regulatory information, if revealed prior to litigation, can encourage a lawsuit
against a guilty defendant and discourage one against an innocent defendant.
Several questions arise: Should liability depend on regulatory information? Should
regulatory information be made available to victims so that they can make more in-
formed decisions about lawsuits? Or should regulatory information be revealed only
during court proceedings? To answer these questions, we develop a model in which a
victim has verifiable harm but is uncertain about its cause: the harm could have been
caused by the defendant or by nature. The victim gathers imperfect information about
the cause of the harm. The government gathers additional independent information
about causahty, which we call "regulatory information." According to the manner in
which regulatory information is revealed and used, we distinguish three regimes: (1)
simple rule, (2) ex ante rule, and (3) ex post rule.
The "simple rule" is the benchmark rule in which the court simply bases its
liability decision on the victim's information and does not consult regulatory infor-
mation. In both the "ex ante" and "ex post" rules, the defendant's liability is based
on both regulatory and the victim's information. These rules differ in terms of when
regulatory information is revealed. In the ex ante rule, regulatory information is re-
vealed before the victim's litigation decision, whereas in the ex post rule it is revealed
after a lawsuit is brought (i.e., during the court proceedings). In practice, the ex ante
rule corresponds roughly to the current U.S. poUcy that makes government-held infor-
mation publicly available. The ex post rule corresponds to discovery activities such as
' Major legislative acts include the Freedom of Information Act, the Security Act of 1933, the Security
Exchange Act of 1934, the Community Right to Know Act, and the Clean Water Act.
^ Prior to 1965, the ratio of private to government cases tended to be 6 to 1 or less. Between the mid-
1960s and late 1970s, the ratio of private to public cases exceeded 20 to 1. The ratio was in the 10 to 1
range in the 1980s. See Salop and White (1988) for more details.
' Throughout this article, the victim is referred to by female terms and the injurer by male terms.
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expert witnessing. It is also relevant when regulatory agencies restrict access to infor-
mation until after litigation," which outside the United States is the rule rather than the
exception.' Even in the United States, access to regulatory information is often limited
until after a victim acquires legal standing as a litigant.*
Comparison of the alternative rules depends critically on the verifiability of the
victim's private information. When the victim's information is verifiable, the ex ante
rule dominates the other rules. By basing a defendant's liability on both victim's and
regulatory information, the former rule punishes the defendant when he is most likely
to have caused the harm. Furthermore, the ex ante rule allows the victim to make a
more informed litigation decision, minimizing the chances of her bringing a lawsuit
when the harm is naturally caused. The latter effect is absent in the two other rules,
since the victim bases her suit decision only on her private information.
In many litigation situations, however, a victim's information takes the form of
"soft evidence," such as first-hand observations by victims and other interested parties.
Despite being informative, the court cannot verify such information, given that the
victim has a vested interest in packaging the evidence in her favor. In this situation,
disinterested third-party evidence, such as regulatory information, will play a critical
role in determining liability.
When the victim's information is unverifiable, the ex post rule may dominate the
ex ante rule. Under the ex ante rule, the victim bases her lawsuit decision on regulatory
information but is unresponsive to her own information (knowing that it would not
affect the defendant's liability). The opposite is true under the ex post rule. Although
the victim cannot incorporate the regulatory information into her lawsuit decision, the
anticipated use of the regulatory information can make her responsive to her private
information, since it signals what regulatory information will reveal in trial. Thus,
comparison of the alternative rules depends on the relative precision of the regulatory
information vis-^-vis the victim's private information. When regulatory information is
sufficiently more precise than the victim's private information, the ex ante rule domi-
nates, whereas the opposite is true when private information is more precise than reg-
ulatory information and the latter is itself sufficiently precise.
The remainder of the article formalizes these ideas. A formal model is presented
in Section 2. Section 3 considers the case where the victim's information is verifiable,
while Section 4 considers the case where it is unverifiable. Finally, Section 5 concludes
by commenting on the robustness of the findings.
2. The model
• We consider a tort situation that has three parties: a victim (or plaintiff), a defen-
dant (or injurer), and the social planner (or government consisting of a regulator and
a court).' The defendant engages in a risky activity that may cause harm to the victim.
By taking a preventive effort, e ^ 0, however, the defendant can reduce the probability
of causing harm to the victim, p(e). We assume that p ' ( ) < 0 and p"() > 0: the
•* These two interpretations of the ex post rule may not be the same if there are positive costs associated
with collecting information.
' For example, the United Kingdom has yet to adopt a system of public access to government-held
information (Marsh, 1987). In many other West European countries, the right of public access to government-
held information is ineffective because of institutional barriers such as long waiting periods, lack of publi-
cation description, etc. (Errera, 1987).
* The Freedom of Information Act exempts from public access some government-held information.
Also, in some cases, parties were denied access to government information based on the act but were granted
access through civil discovery. See Pleasant Hill Bank v. US [58 FR.D. 97, 99, 101 (W.D. Ma. 1973)] and
Baldrige v. Shapiro [455 U.S. 345, 71 L.E.D. 2d 199, 102 S. Ct. 1103].
' The social planner is referred to as a regulator or a court, whichever is appropriate for the context.
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probability of the defendant's causing harm decreases with preventive effort at a di-
minishing rate. To ensure an interior solution, we further assume that p'(0) = -<» and
p'(°°) = 0. The defendant's effort is unobservable tp the other parties.
The victim can alternatively be harmed by a natural accident with probability n(> 0).
The two events of harm are mutually exclusive, with n + p(e) < 1 for all e > 0. Note
that the defendant has no control over the likelihood of naturally caused harm. The
harm results in a loss, /, that is randomly drawn from [0, L] by the same distribution
function F and density / , regardless of the source.* In other words, the same risky
activity causes different levels of harm, depending on the random circumstances.'
The victim, if injured, acquires only imperfect knowledge about the source of harm.
She draws a private signal s € {s^ Sj}, where s„ and Sj respectively indicate that harm
was naturally and defendant-caused. The signal could represent, for example, the plain-
tiff's knowledge of her health condition, episodes of rivals' predatory trade practices, or
experience of product malfunctions. The precision of the signal is represented by 5 e
[Vi, 1], the probability of receiving a correct signal conditional on the actual cause of
harm. When 5 = Vi, the signal is uninformative; when S = 1, the signal is perfectly
informative. The victim draws her signal prior to her litigation decision. Although we
do not explicitly model how the signal is revealed during litigation, we assume that the
presence of such information is public knowledge, so even a signal that is unfavorable
to the plaintiff is revealed during trial, for example, at the defendant's request.
A lawsuit by the victim (or plaintiff) always results in litigation.'" The plaintiff
and the defendant bear their litigation costs, ĉ  and Cj, respectively (i.e., the American
fee system). The social planner designs the liability system as well as the information
system. When trial occurs, the social planner verifies the realized harm, /, and deter-
mines the defendant's liability. Unobservability of the defendant's effort precludes a
liability rule depending on it (e.g., negligence rule), so the court uses a strict liability
rule that depends on verifiable causality information."
In addition to the victim's causality signal, the social planner can acquire, through
ex ante regulatory monitoring or ex post discovery, causality information, r € {/•„, r^},
where r„ and r^ respectively indicate that the harm was naturally and defendant-
caused.'^ This signal could represent, for example, regulatory information about the
carcinogenic quality of air pollution, "smoking gun" evidence of a predatory practice,
or information on safety problems in a car design. The precision of the signal is rep-
resented hy 0 e [Vi, I], the probability of receiving a correct signal conditional on the
actual cause of harm.
The three rules that the planner chooses are more precisely described as follows:
(i) Simple rule: The social planner does not draw r. In litigation, the defendant is
liable if and only if s = Sj, when the signal is verifiable. When the plaintiff's signal is
unverifiable, the defendant is liable for all verified harm.'^
' The assumption that the distribution of harm is independent of the source of harm is not essential.
Our results remain valid, provided that the plaintiff does not infer causality perfectly from the realized level
of harm.
' Alternatively, there is a continuum of victims with different levels of harm. The subsequent results
of the article hold with this interpretation, unless victims' signals are independent and the court can aggregate
the victims' information efficiently. In the latter case, the court can establish perfect causality, by the law of
large numbers.
'" That is, we abstract from the possibility of pretrial settlement. This assumption is obviously unreal-
istic, since most lawsuits result in settlement. See Section 5 for further discussion of this issue.
" Our model departs from the existing models of strict liability that assume the court's ability to
establish causality of harm without errors. Shavell (1985) also considers imperfect causality information in
a different context.
'̂  In practice, the government may control the precision of signal at some costs.
" This assumption is in keeping with the standard description of strict liability, according to which
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(ii) Ex ante rule: The social planner draws r when the harm occurs and makes the
information available to the plaintiff prior to the latter's lawsuit decision. When trial
occurs, the defendant is liable if and only if r = r̂  and s = Sj (i.e., when both signals
implicate the defendant), if s is verifiable.'* If .$ is unverifiable, the defendant is liable
if and only if r = r^.
(iii) Ex post rule: The social planner draws r only after a lawsuit is brought (e.g.,
during discovery). Equivalently, the social planner collects r but withholds it until after
a lawsuit is brought. Liability is determined in the same way as in (ii).
Under each rule, we assume that the social planner can adjust the level of damages
in an ex ante credible way with a multiplier, m > 0. In other words, a prevailing
plaintiff with harm / receives ml, and a losing defendant pays ml. This type of damage
adjustment can be achieved through the imposition of punitive damages when m > \.
While our purpose here is primarily normative—to examine the potential of each rule
under the best policy arrangement currently available''—the damage adjustment that
we envision is consistent with the current use of punitive damages. Under the current
system, judges instruct the juries to set punitive damages, not by a fixed multiplier, but
often to fit the deterrence needs of a specific setting.'* In this sense, our analysis
imposes no additional requirement: judges can inform the juries of the deterrence needs
under each rule.
3. When the plaintiff's information is verifiable
• In this section we assume that the plaintiff's causality signal is verifiable and thus
admissible in court as evidence. We analyze each regime by backward induction, start-
ing from the plaintiff's lawsuit decision, moving next to the defendant's effort choice,
and finally examining the social planner's damage award adjustment. At the end of this
section we compare the performance of alternative rules.
Q Simple rule. Given a damage multiplier, m, the plaintiff brings a lawsuit when
she can establish the defendant's liability and her expected damage award is no less
than her litigation costs. Since under the simple rule the court relies on the plaintiff's
signal to determine the defendant's liability, the plaintiff will bring a lawsuit if and
only if (a) s = Sj and (b) ml > c^. Given the defendant's effort e, the plaintiff receives
a signal Sj if either defendant-caused harm correctly triggers the plaintiff's signal or
naturally caused harm incorrectly triggers the plaintiff's signal. The combined proba-
bility of these events is [p{e)8 + «(1 - 8)]. The probability of (b) is (1 — Fi^Cplm)).
Thus the probability of a lawsuit is
proving harm is sufficient for establishing a defendant's hability. Our results remain qualitatively unaffected
if the defendant is liable with probability less than one.
'•' This rule represents just one possible evidence standard that can be employed by the court. Alter-
natively, the court may use an evidence standard that is more unfavorable to the defendant (e.g., only one
unfavorable signal may be required to convict the defendant). This alternative standard is socially inferior to
the one considered in this article. The proof is available upon request.
" The government may conceivably use other instruments, such as fee shifting and the decoupling of
damages. The former instrument is inferior to damage adjustment (Kaplow, 1993), whereas the latter instru-
ment, though theoretically superior to damage adjustment (Polinsky and Che, 1991), is seldom used in
practice. Relatively speaking, punitive damages are much more common (Daniels and Martin, 1995). More-
over, our main results are robust to the decoupling arrangement.
" Supreme Court decisions clearly state that (a) a jury is "instructed to consider . . . the need to deter
similar conduct" when awarding punitive damages, and (b) no "mathematical bright line" should be drawn
with regard to a fixed damage multiplier "that would fit every case." See Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.
V. Haslip [499 U.S. 1 (1991)] and TXO Production Corporation v. Alliance Resources Corporation [125 L.
Ed. 2d 366 (1993)].
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<t>Xe, m) = [pie)S + n(l - 5)](1 - F(c^/m)). (1)
Next we consider the defendant's problem of choosing an effort level. Let
/(m) = E{l\l > Cp/m} denote the plaintiff's expected loss conditional on ml > c^. Then
the defendant's expected payment conditional on being sued (and found liable) equals the
expected damage award m'l(m) and his litigation costs Cj. The defendant chooses e to
min e + <l>Xe, m){m'l(m) + c^}.
The assumptions about p(-) ensure the existence of a unique, interior solution for any
m ^ 0. The associated first-order condition is
1 + p\e)8(l - FiCp/m)){ml(m) + c,} = 0. (2)
Notice that the naturally triggered lawsuit has no effect on the defendant's effort choice.
Note also that raising the multiplier increases the level of effort chosen by the defendant
(since p ' ( ) < 0 and the coefficient on p'{e) is increasing in m).
The social planner's problem is to choose the damage multiplier, m, and the in-
duced level of effort, e, in order to minimize expected social loss. Formally,
minp(e)7 + e + (f>,(e, m){c + c^}
(3)
such that e satisfies (2),
where 7 = £[/], the (unconditional) expected loss from harm. Note that the naturally
caused harm is excluded since it is beyond the social plarmer's control. A solution to
(3) exists, and we denote it as (m^ e,).^'' We assume that m,> 0 (i.e., it is never optimal
to block litigation altogether), which can be guaranteed by assuming that ĉ  and Q are
small relative to 7.
Recall that if the plaintiff's signal is not perfectly informative (S < 1), naturally
caused harm can result in a lawsuit. As can be seen from (3), this lawsuit imposes
social costs but has no value in providing deterrence. On this count, the next two rules
can improve upon the simple rule.
o Ex ante rule. Under the ex ante rule, the social planner gathers signal r and
releases it to the plaintiff prior to her decision to sue. If a lawsuit is brought, the
defendant is found liable in trial if evidence from both the plaintiff and the social
plarmer implicates the defendant. Given this hability rule, the plaintiff brings a lawsuit
if and only if r = r̂ , ,s = s^, and m ^ c^, or with probability
<i,,(,e. m) = [p{e)86 + «(1 - 5)(1 - 0](1 - Fic^lm)). (4)
The defendant's problem is analogous to the simple rule. He chooses e to
min e + 4>J,e, m){nil(jn) + Cj).
The first-order condition for this problem is
" By the assumptions on p(), there is no loss of generality in restricting the support of m to an interval
[0, A/] for some M < oo. Since e satisfying (2) is continuous in m and the objective function is continuous
in e and m, existence follows. The same argument holds for all subsequent social planner's problems.
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1 + p\e)S9(l - F{c^lm)){ml{m) + c j = 0. (5)
The social planner's problem is the following:
xmn p{e)l + e + <^^{e, m){Cp + cj
e.m (6)
such that e satisfies (5),
and its solution is denoted by (m^ ej.
• Ex post rule. Under the ex post rule, although liability depends on both signals,
r and s, the plaintiff has no access to the social planner's information prior to her suit
decision. Thus, the plaintiff can base her suit decision only on her own signal. The
plaintiff sues if s = Sj and her expected recovery justifies her court costs. Without
knowing r, however, the plaintiff does not know if she will prevail (i.e., if the defendant
will be found liable). Instead, she can only form a belief about the probability of
prevailing (i.e., r = r^), given s = s^. According to Bayes' rule, this probability is
9Sp(e) + (1 - eXl - S)n
8p{e) + (1 - S)n
if the plaintiff believes that the defendant has chosen e. Notice that a{e) is a weighted
average of B and \ — 9 and equal to 6 when 5 = 1 (i.e., the plaintiff has no doubt
about causality). Also, a ( ) is (weakly) decreasing; i.e., the plaintiff is more certain of
prevailing when she believes that a lower level of effort has been taken.
The plaintiff's expected recovery is a{e)ml. Hence, the plaintiff brings a lawsuit
if and only if s = Sj and a(e)ml s Cp, or with probability
(f>p(e. e, m) = [pie)8 + n(l - 5)][1 - FiCp/a(e)m )]. (7)
Note that (7) differs from (1) only because of the plaintiff's uncertain prospect of
prevailing.
Knowing the liability rule and the plaintiff's suit decision, the defendant chooses
e to
min e + (t>pie. e. m){cj + a(e)m/(a(e)m)},
for any m and the plaintiff's belief e. Note that the defendant assesses the probability
of his being liable based on the actual level of his effort. This problem has a unique
minimizer, e{e), for any belief e. In equilibrium, the plaintiff's belief must be consistent:
e{e) = e. This condition is satisfied by a unique, positive value of e, since e(0) > 0
and e(-) is nonincreasing.'* The unique equilibrium effort level e is characterized by
the following first-order condition:
1 + p'(e)S[l - F(Cp/aie)m)]{em'l(a(,e)m) + c,} = 0. (8)
The social planner's problem is
'*The result follows from Theorem 4 of Milgrom and Shannon (1994), since the objective function
satisfies the single-crossing property in (e, e) and has a unique minimizer for each e a 0.
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min;7(e)7 + e + <l> (e, e, m){c + Q }
(9)
such that e satisfies (8).
The solution to (9) is denoted as (m^, e^).
Q Comparison of regimes. The social objective in each rule is to provide the right
amount of deterrence at the minimum litigation cost. Comparison of alternative rules,
therefore, boils down to the tradeoff between the deterrence and litigation costs that
each rule entails. The deterrence of alternative rules is characterized by the defendant's
first-order conditions shown in (2), (5), and (8), while litigation costs are summarized
by the probability of a lawsuit shown in (1), (4), and (7).
We first compare the simple rule and the ex ante rule. Comparing (1) and (4)
reveals that the ex ante rule has two qualitatively different effects.
The first is what we call the "Becker effect": given the same m, the ex ante rule
excludes the defendant-triggered lawsuit with probability I - 6. In the public enforce-
ment context, this procedure, coupled with an appropriately increased penalty, is known
to reduce enforcement costs without weakening deterrence (Becker, 1968). Its outcome
is less clear in the context of private litigation, however. As m is raised to restore
deterrence once a suit is randomly excluded, the victim's incentive for suit increases,
which at least partially offsets the initial exclusion effect.
The net effect depends on whether the conditional adjusted award m'l(m) increases
or decreases when m is raised. If rril{m) increases with m, the increase in m needed to
restore the same level of deterrence is small enough that the probability of a defendant-
triggered lawsuit is lower under the ex ante rule than under the simple rule (see (4)
and (5)). Therefore, the Becker effect exists and favors the ex ante rule over the simple
rule. However, if ml(m) decreases with m, the increase in m needed to restore deterrence
is so large that the probability of a defendant-triggered lawsuit actually increases. In
this case, the Becker effect is reversed. Whether rrU(m) is increasing or decreasing in
m is generally ambiguous (since /(m) decreases in m), but /n/(m) is likely to be increas-
ing for a broad class of distribution functions." Throughout the analysis, we assume
that m'l{m) is nondecreasing in m. This assumption permits the Becker effect to be
operative but weak.̂ "
The second effect is the "information effect": the relative likelihood of a naturally
triggered lawsuit to a defendant-triggered lawsuit is smaller under the ex ante rule than
under the simple rule. To understand this effect, set the multiplier under the ex ante
rule, m', so that the probability of a defendant-triggered lawsuit is the same as it is
under the simple rule. That is, ^1 - Fic^/m')) = (1 - F(Cp/m,)). With m', the prob-
ability of a naturally triggered lawsuit under the ex ante rule is less than that under the
simple rule for 0 > Vi, since
nil -
- 1 ~ ^
0
The information effect arises because the additional information provided by the social
planner allows the plaintiff to avoid suing when the harm is likely to be naturally
" For example, ml(m) is increasing if F follows the uniform distribution, and, regardless of the distri-
bution function, mi(m) tends to «: as m approaches oo.
^ In fact, all our results hold even when mi(m) decreases, as long as it does not do so too fast.
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caused. Given that a naturally triggered lawsuit has no value in providing deterrence
(see (2) and (5)), the information effect always favors the ex ante rule.
Combining these two effects, we conclude that if the Becker effect is not reversed
or if the reversion is not too strong, the ex ante rule induces, under the appropriately
chosen multipher, the same level of the defendant's effort at a lower likelihood of a
lawstiit (especially the naturally triggered one) than the simple rule. Thus, the ex ante
rule dominates the simple rule.
We next compare the ex ante and ex post rules. Under the ex post rule, the plaintiff
has no access to regulatory information before bringing a suit, just hke under the simple
rule. Therefore, the information effect again favors the ex ante rule over the ex post
rule. The Becker effect, however, is ambiguous between the two rules. Just like the ex
ante rule, the ex post rule excludes a defendant-triggered lawsuit with some probability.
Nevertheless, the ex ante rule can be shown to dominate the ex post rule. The results
are presented in the following proposition.
Proposition L For any 6 > Vi and 8 < 1, the g;c ante rule is socially more desirable
than the ex post rule, which is in tum more desirable than the simple rule.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The second result deserves a remark. Under both the simple rule and the ex post
rule, the plaintiff cannot base her suit decision on the social plarmer's realized signal.
Yet the ex post rule performs better than the simple rule. This result can be attributed
to the plaintiff's uncertain prospect of receiving the favorable regulatory signal in cotirt
under the ex post rule. Because of this uncertainty, the effective ex ante award multiplier
facing the plaintiff in her suit decision is 8a{e)m, while the effective ex ante penalty
multiplier facing the defendant is 89ni. Since a{e) < d when 5 < 1 and 0 > %, the ex
post rule creates the effect of decoupling: from an ex ante perspective, the defendant
pays more than the plaintiff receives. This kind of decoupling makes an enforcement
system more efficient (Polinsky and Che, 1991).
The above proposition suggests that more information is better. The same can be
said when the precision of a given signal increases. The use of a more accurate signal
reduces the chance of a naturally triggered lawsuit relative to a defendant-triggered
lawsuit, which allows the social planner to generate a given level of deterrence at lower
litigation costs than otherwise.
Proposition 2. (i) The expected social loss decreases in 8 under the simple rule and in
8 and 9 under the ex ante and ex post rules, (ii) If S = 1, expected social loss under
the simple and ex post rules is identical, and naturally caused harm does not result in
a lawsuit; if in addition 9 = 1, all three rules are equivalent.
The proof of Proposition 2 closely resembles that of Proposition 1 and is thus
omitted. The second statement deserves a remark. If the victim has a perfectly infor-
mative signal, she is capable of making a fully informed decision about her lawsuit.
In this case, conditioning the defendant's liability on the additional signal (provided by
the govemment) has no effect other than excluding the defendant-triggered suit with
some probability. When 9 = 1, the latter effect disappears, so all three rules become
identical.
4. When the plaintiff's signal is unverifiabie
• When the victim's causality signal is unverifiabie, the court's liability decision can
only be based on the regulatory signal. Then, under the simple mle, the defendant is
always hable, while under the two other mles he is liable only if the govemment
presents evidence implicating him. The comparison between the simple mle and the
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ex ante and ex post rules is the same as before—the latter two rules dominate the
simple rule—and is omitted. Therefore, we focus on the comparison between the ex
ante and ex post rules.
D Ex ante rule. The ex ante rule works the same as in the previous section, except
that the court's liability decision does not reflect the victim's signal due to its unveri-
fiable nature. The latter fact implies that the victim does not base her suit decision on
her signal, knowing that it would not affect the court's liability decision.
The victim now sues if r = r̂  and ml s c^. When the defendant chooses e, the
plaintiff will bring a suit with probability
'Paie, m) ^ [pie)e + n(l - 0)]{1 - F(,Cplm)}. (10)
Facing this probability, the defendant chooses e to
min e + i}ije, m){m~l(_m) + Cj}.
The first-order condition for this problem is
1 + p'(e)e[l - F(c^/m)]{ml(m) + c,} = 0. (11)
Unlike in the previous section, neither (10) nor (11) contains 8. In other words,
the victim's signal has no effect on the likelihood of a suit and the defendant's effort
decision. Hence, the victim may sue even when she is certain of the defendant's in-
nocence, and may not sue when she is certain of the defendant's guilt. As before, the
social planner picks m and e to:
r m n p { e ) l + e + i}f^i, ) { p Q }
such that e satisfies (11).
We denote the solution to (12) by (m^, ej.
• Ex post rule. Under the ex post rule, the victim cares about the realized regulatory
signal, r, for it solely determines the defendant's liability, as under the ex ante rule. Because
the signal is not revealed imdl after a suit is brought, however, the plaintiff cannot base her
suit decision on that signal. Instead, the plaintiff can only anticipate the realization of r based
on her own signal. Suppose the victim believes that the defendant has expanded effort e. If
her signal implicates the defendant (s = Sj), she sues if and only if a{e)ml s ĉ , where a(e)
is defined in Section 3. If, on the contrary, her signal indicates that the harm was
naturally caused (s = Sn), then she sues if and only if b(e)ml ^ c^,, where
_ g(l - 8)pie) + (1 - e)8n
(1 - 8)pie) + 8n
is the posterior probability of her prevailing (i.e., r = r^), given s = s„ and belief e.
This probability is a weighted average of I - 6 and 9 and is equal to 1 - 0 when 8
is one (i.e., the plaintiff has no doubt about causality). Observe that b(e) ^ a(e) for all
e, which implies that the plaintiff is more likely to sue when s = Sj than when s = s^.
(The equality holds when the victim's signal is uninformative.) In other words, unlike
under the ex ante rule, the victim's signal affects her suit decision under the ex post
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rule. In particular, the victim's signal has the most significant effect on her suit decision
when both signals are informative. When both 8 and 6 approach one, b{e) goes to zero
and a(e) goes to one. In this case, the victim will sue if and only if 5 = Sj, since for
any positive m, b(e)m « 0 < ĉ  (i.e., a suit is not profitable if .y = sj.
It may be surprising that the predictive power of the victim's signal depends also
on 0. To see why, suppose 5 = 1 but 0 = Vi (i.e., the regulatory signal is uninformative).
Then, b{e) = a(e). In this case, the victim's signal does not affect her suit decision.
The reason is simple: while the victim's signal is perfectly informative about true
causality, it has no predictive value as to the causality that the court will find in trial,
which depends on the (uninformative) regulatory signal.
The probability that the plaintiff brings a lawsuit is
ilfp(e, e, m) = i/^(e, e, m) + i/<̂ (e, e, m), (13)
where
il4{e, e, m) = [p(e)5 + «(1
and
g, e, m) ^ Vp{e\\ - S)
are the probabilities of a lawsuit associated with the plaintiff receiving s^ and «„, re-
spectively.
Knowing the liability rule and the plaintiff's suit decision, the defendant chooses
his effort e to minimize the expected losses:
min e + i/<̂ (e, e, m){Cj + a(e)m'l(a(e)m)} + tl)"Je, e. m){Cj + b(e)m'l(b(e)m)}.
As before, we study a unique equihbrium level of effort that satisfies the first-order
condition
1 + p'(e)8[l - F(c^/a(e)m)]{dm'l{a(e)m) + c,} ^^4^
+ p'ieXl - S)[l - FiCp/bie)m)]{0ml{b(,e)m) + cJ = 0.
(Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium can be established as in Section 3.) The two
coefficients on p'(e) capture the amounts of deterrence generated by the suit following
s = Sj and the suit following s = s„, respectively. One can verify that the suit following
s = Sj creates more deterrence per unit probability of a suit than does the suit following
s = s„. Intuitively, the former type of suit more likely punishes the defendant when he is
actually responsible for the harm. Therefore, the former type of suit is socially more
desirable. In the special case where 8 and 6 are both close to one, the ex post rule induces
a socially efficient suit decision from the victim, as she sues only if s = s^.
Again, the social planner chooses m and e to
min p(e)l + e + i}ip{e, w){c_ -I- Q }
(15)
such that e satisfies (14).
The solution to this problem is denoted as (w ,̂ gp).
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a Comparison of regimes. The tradeoff between the two rules is clear from the
discussion of the preceding subsections. Although the ex ante rule induces the victim
to condition her suit decision on the regulatory signal, it fails to induce her to be
responsive to her own signal. The converse is true with the ex post rule, under which
the victim is unresponsive to the regulatory signal but does incorporate her own signal
into the suit decision (in trying to anticipate the regulatory signal).
Thus the issue boils down to the following question: To which signal should the
victim be made responsive? Intuition suggests that if the victim's signal is relatively
less informative than the social planner's signal, then the ex ante rule must be preferred
to the ex post rule. The previous subsection, meanwhile, suggests that if both signals
are sufficiently informative, the ex post rule performs relatively well. These conjectures
are verified in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. (i) The ex ante rule (at least weakly) dominates the ex post rule if either
5 or 0 is sufficiently close to Vi. (The dominance is strict if, in addition, 9 > Vi.) (ii)
The ex post rule dominates the ex ante rule if 8 > 6, 0 is sufficiently high, and n
> p(ej - € for some e > 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The last assumption means that the naturally caused harm is relatively significant.
Intuitively, the value of deterring the naturally triggered lawsuit is high in such a case.
The above proposition has interesting policy implications for public access to reg-
ulatory information: Revealing regulatory information is socially desirable when either
the victim's signal or the regulatory signal is poor, while withholding regulatory in-
formation is desirable if both signals are good and the victim's signal is better. The
latter possibility is the most novel result of this article and lends support to selective
liniitation of public access to regulatory information in situations where the public has
better information than the government. One application may be found in the area of
simple accident cases. If the victim has first-hand infonnation about the injurer's guilt
or innocence, it may be socially desirable to limit the victim's access to the information
held by a third-party witness until after the victim brings a lawsuit, since the with-
holding of the information can make the victim act more responsibly in making her
suit decision.
5. Concluding remarks
• We conclude by commenting on the robustness of our results and further impli-
cations.
• Compensatory damages. We have assumed that the social planner can adjust
damages. While this assumption allows us to focus on the normative aspects of man-
aging regulatory information, it is also useful to examine this issue in a compensatory
damages setting (where m is restricted to be one). When damages cannot be adjusted,
there is underdeterrence, since the defendant does not internalize the litigation costs of
the plaintiff. Under the ex ante rule, this underdeterrence problem is worsened because
of the exclusion effect, so the application of compensatory damages disfavors the ex
ante rule. Still, the benefit of screening a naturally triggered lawsuit remains an im-
portant consideration. In fact, given stronger conditions, our main results continue to
hold with compensatory damages.^' Of course, compensatory damages introduce other
'̂ If d and n are close to one, then the exclusion effect associated with the ex ante rule is negligible,
whereas the benefit of blocking the naturally triggered suit is large, so the ex ante rule dominates the simple
rule as in Proposition 1. Proposition 3 holds under qualitatively similar conditions.
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issues (such as the potential optimality of other evidentiary rules), which warrant further
studies.
o Pretrial discovery. We have assumed that a lawsuit always results in trial. This
assumption, while simplifying our analysis greatly, is unrealistic because most legal
disputes are settled before trial. If pretrial settlement involves costless discovery, it can
affect the ex post rule adversely, since the victim may sue regardless of her own signal
and simply drop her case if discovery reveals Uttle chance of prevailing. In practice,
however, pretrial discovery can be costly. First of all, it usually requires the involve-
ment of attorneys. Second, discovery requires the parties seeking information to bring
oral deposition against information sources, which can be often costly. If pretrial dis-
covery is costly, the main results of our article still hold.
• Costly information gathering. In the analysis, we assumed that parties gather
their signals costlessly. In practice, regulatory monitoring may incur substantial expen-
ditures. Introduction of information-gathering costs favors the ex post rule relative to
the ex ante rule. The ex ante rule is not cost effective because it requires information
to be gathered even when there is no subsequent litigation. The ex post rule may allow
information to be gathered only when a suit is brought. In some cases, however, the
ex ante rule still appears to be a favorable option. In securities cases, for example, the
regulatory agency (the Securities and Exchange Commission) can almost costlessly
gather information by simply requiring firms to report their financial status. In envi-
ronmental cases, even though regulatory monitoring is costly, it may be the only way
to gather accurate information about pollution. In other words, when victims have very
coarse information, the ex ante rule may still be a dominant choice (recall Proposition
3 (i)).
n Frivolous suits. The concern of our article can be rephrased as how to deter
lawsuits when plaintiffs are relatively certain of defendants' innocence. In our frame-
work, these kinds of suits are meritless because even though they constitute social
costs, they do not generate any deterrence. Yet these suits are not exactly "frivolous"
by the conventional definition, according to which a lawsuit is frivolous if the plaintiff
has a low probability of winning and brings the suit solely to extract a settlement
(Rosenberg and Shavell, 1985; Bebchuk, 1988; Katz, 1990; Polinsky and Rubinfeld,
1993). This conventional definition is not appropriate in a world where courts lack the
ability to uncover truth. The cases that have a high chance of prevailing according to
public information may actually be meritless according to (potentially superior but
unverifiable) information that plaintiffs themselves possess. Our "information-based"
notion of meritless suits may be useful in this situation.
Appendix
• Proofs of Propositions 1 and 3 follow.
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove the first statement, fix any 0 > Vi, d < 1. Suppose that, under the ex ante
rule, the multiplier is set at m' so that the probability of a suit is the same as that under the ex post rule
(with its optimal multipher m ,̂), given that the defendant chooses the same effort ê  under both regimes. That
is, m' satisfies (̂ Ĉê , m') = <t>p(ep, ê , m )̂, or
1 - F(c^/m') = —j-(l - F(c/a(ep)m^)). (Al)
(Such an m' exists, since <t>o(ep, •) is continuous and can take any value between zero and one.) Since a^e^) < 1,
(Al) implies that m' > a(ep)m .̂ Now substitute (Al) into (5). Then, the coefficient of p'(e) in (5) (under the
ex ante rule) is
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(1 - F(c^/m'))Se{m''l(m')
a (1 - F(cMe^)m,))a-^{a(e,)m;i(a(e,)m^) + c,}
" a(.ep)
> (1 — F(Ci,la(ei,)mp))8{8mpl(a(ej,)mp) + Cj).
The first inequality follows since m' > aie^^mp and since ml(ni) is nondecreasing in m. The last inequality follows
since a(ep) < 8 for 8 > hi and S < 1. Notice that the last line of the above inequalities is the coefficient of p'(e)
in (8) (i.e., under the ex post rule). It follows that the ex ante rule induces more effort than e ,̂ with m'. Hence,
there exists an m"(< m') with which the ex ante rule induces e .̂ (Recall that e is increasing in m under the ex
ante rule.) Since m" < m', the probabihty of a suit that is needed to induce e^ is smaller under the ex ante rule.
Since m" is not necessarily optimal under the ex ante rule, the ex ante rule dominates the ex post rule.
We adopt a similar method to prove the second result. Suppose that under the ex post rule the multiplier
m' is set so that the same effort level is induced as under the simple rule (with the optimal multiplier m,).
The multiplier m' then must make the coefficient of p'(e) in (8) equal to that in (2) given e = e,, or
(1 - F{Cp/a(e,)m')){em'Ka(eJm') + c,} = (1 - F(c/m,)){m ,/(m,) + Q } . (A2)
Since a(e,) < 8 for 6 > Vi and 6 < 1, a(e,)m' < m,, or else the left-hand side of (A2) exceeds its right-hand
side. Consequently,
In sum, the same effort is induced at a lower likelihood of a suit given m' under the ex post rule. Since m'
is not necessarily optimal under the ex post rule, it dominates the simple rule. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. To prove (i), it suffices to show that the result holds when either S = V2 or 6 = V2.
Then, by the continuity of the indirect objective functions of (12) and (15) in (S, ff), the result holds in
neighborhoods of S = Vi and of 8 = V2. The key point of the proof is that when either & = Vi or 8 = Vi,
b() = a() , which implies that the victim ignores her signal in her litigation decision. Given this result, the
proof follows the same line of argument as that of Proposition 1 and is omitted.
Next we prove (ii). Let /LI(0, S) be the set of multipliers that entail the same probability of a lawsuit
under the ex post rule as does m^ under the ex ante rule. If /u(S, S) is empty, the ex post rule clearly dominates
the ex ante rule, since e^ can be induced at a lower probability of a lawsuit under the former regime.^^ So,
assume that /i(S, 6) is nonempty and let M be the supremum of fx(8, S). One can verify that p,{8, 5) is compact.
Thus, M < 00. Since fo(e) goes to zero as 8 and S approach one, there exists a sufficiently high 6' < I such
that, for all S > e > ff, b(eJML < c^ (i.e., the probabihty of a suit is zero). Fix any (ft 5) such that 5 > S > ff,
and let m' € jU.(ft 6). Since m' £ M, the probability of a suit is zero under the ex post rule when the victim
observes 5 = s„. Therefore, m' satisfies i//̂ (ê , £„, m') = ^Jie^ m j , or
1 - Fi^Cp/a^eJm') = p{8, S)(l - F(cJmJ), (A3)
where p(ft S) = [p(eje + n(l - 8)]/[p(eJd + n(l - 6)]. We initially assume thatp(ej < n. Then p(e, 5) > 1,
which implies that a^ejm' a m^ (see (A3)). Then, at e = ê  and m = m', the coefficient of p'(e) in (14) is
S(l - FiCi,/a(eJm')){8mi{a(eJm') + Cj)
= S8m' I If (I) dl + S(l — F(Cpla(e^)ni'y)Cj
i
^^ That iJL(d, 5) = 0 implies that the probability of a lawsuit is smaller under the ex post rule, for all
levels of multiplier, than under the ex ante rule with m^. Therefore, £„ can be induced under the ex post rule
at a smaller probability of a lawsuit.
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where the inequality follows since S > 6, 6 ^ a(ej, and a(e^m' a m„. Notice that the last line is the
coefficient of p'(e) under the ex ante rule (see equation (11)). This shows that the ex post rule with m'
induces a higher effort than e^. It then follows that there exists m"(< m') with which the ex post rule induces
e .̂ But at m" the probability of a suit is lower under the optimal ex post rule. Since m" is not necessarily
optimal under the ex post rule, the ex post rule dominates the ex ante rule. Since the result holds with strict
inequality, by continuity, it holds when n > p(e») - € for some e > 0. Q.E.D.
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